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The sense of agency (SoA) is defined as “the registration that I am the initiator of my
actions.” Both “direct” and “indirect” measurement of SoA has focused on specific
contextualized perceptual events, however it has also been demonstrated that “higher
level” cognitions seemingly affect the SoA. We designed a measure of person’s general,
context-free beliefs about having core agency—the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS). An
exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analyses on samples of 236 (Study 1) and
408 (Study 2) participants yielded two correlated factors we labeled Sense of Positive
Agency (SoPA) and Sense of Negative Agency (SoNA). The construct validity of SoAS
is demonstrated by its low-to-moderate correlations with conceptually relevant tools
and by the moderate-strong relationship between the SoNA subscale and obsessive-
compulsive (OC) symptoms (r = 0.35). We conclude that the SoAS seems to isolate
people’s general beliefs in their agency from their perceived success in obtaining
outcomes.
Keywords: sense of agency, agency-related beliefs, direct measures of agency, expectancy, judgment of agency
INTRODUCTION
After being the focus of much psychological research (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978; Newman
et al., 1983), the construct of agency and its nomological relatives (such as “freedom,” “control,”
“authorship,” “free will,” and “helplessness”) have, since the mid 1980’s, largely disappeared from
central stage. However, the last few years have seen a resurge of interest in the topic, driven mostly
(but not solely) by the neurosciences, which largely focused on the precursors of the sense of agency
(e.g., Aarts et al., 2012; David, 2012). The sense of agency (SoA) was defined by Synofzik et al. (2013)
as “the registration that I am the initiator of my actions” and studies exploring agency defined
in this manner generally use two main methods: “direct” and “indirect” measures (De Houwer,
2003). Direct measures usually include rating scales and self-report questionnaires that explicitly
ask about various facets of a person’s sense of agency over a specific event. Indirect measures, in
contrast, are not direct questions about the extent to which a person feels as the agent of the action
or effect in question (Dewey and Knoblich, 2014) but are assumed to be contingent on a prior
(unintentional, non-deliberate, seemingly unconscious) computation of one’s agency in regard to
a specific environmental change. There are two phenomena: sensory attenuation and intentional
binding (which we elaborate on below), both of which have been empirically shown to be associated
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with factors relevant to human agency (e.g., volition) or with
predictions derived from a prominent model of the judgment of
agency—the so called “comparatormodel” (Feinberg, 1978; Frith,
1987)1.
In contrast to such indirect measures of agency, direct
measures may attempt to measure one’s sense of agency by
asking, for example, to what degree a person believes he/she
was responsible for a perceptual change (Aarts et al., 2005;
Haggard and Chambon, 2012) or to what degree did he/she feel
“in control” while playing a computer game (e.g., Metcalfe and
Greene, 2007) or to what degree did she think that her action
brought about the effect (see Frith, 2013). Interestingly, although
such “local” explicit judgments of agency were used, researchers
have consistently found them to be uncorrelated with the
implicit measures described above (Kumar and Srinivasan, 2013),
experimental manipulations of people’s beliefs in their agency
within a specific situation were repeatedly documented to affect
indirect measures. One such example is the modulation of the
“intentional binding” phenomenon (Haggard et al., 2002)—the
“compression” in the perceived time interval between performing
a voluntary action and observing its effect. In recent years,
the intentional binding effect has become a proxy for SoA
(Moore et al., 2012; Saito et al., 2015). This phenomenon has
also been shown to be sensitive to perceivers’ expectancies and
beliefs of control over the to-be-bound effect. For example, when
varying degrees of automatisation were inserted in the control
over an action-effect in the context of an aircraft navigation
task (from full operator control to full automatic control)—
intentional binding was shown to occur as a function of perceived
degree of manual control over the system (Berberian et al., 2012).
Similarly, self-reported intentions to produce (or to stop) an
effect were also shown to modulate intentional binding (Engbert
and Wohlschläger, 2007) as were experimentally manipulated
beliefs regarding the source of the effect (self vs. other agent;
Desantis et al., 2011; Haering and Kiesel, 2012).
Consciously held beliefs or expectancies about one’s SoA
were also found to modulate the second indirect measure
of SoA—the sensory attenuation effect. Sensory attenuation is
the reduction in the perceived intensity of haptic (Blakemore
et al., 1998, 1999), auditory (Weiss et al., 2011; Reznik et al.,
2015), and visual (Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011) stimuli
that are perceived as being produced by one’s own actions.
Experimentally manipulated perceptions of the source of the
effect (self vs. other) were shown to modulate the sensory
attenuation of effects—with ostensibly self-produced effects
being attenuated more than ostensibly other-produced ones (e.g.,
Desantis et al., 2012).
Thus, although direct measures of “local” or highly
contextualized SoA (e.g., “to what degree did you cause the
stimulus to flash?”) were often found to be unrelated to indirect
measures of SoA in the same contexts (however, see Karsh
et al., 2016), a significant amount of empirical evidence shows
that experimentally manipulating people’s cognitions regarding
1Another phenomenon—“motivation from control”—has also been recently
demonstrated to be sensitive to very similar factors and hence may be a third
indirect index of SoA (Eitam et al., 2013; Karsh and Eitam, 2015; Karsh et al., 2016).
their own agency does have a causal effect in modulating such
implicit measures of agency. In fact, the evidence for the effect
of such consciously held beliefs2, as well as other lines of work
on SoA (e.g., Wegner et al., 2003) have warranted a revision to
the dominant model of SoA (Synofzik et al., 2007, 2013; Gentsch
and Schütz-Bosbach, 2015). The key revision in the model is the
recognition of the role of judgments of agency that are argued to
stem from one’s agency-related cognitions. These are contrasted
with feelings of agency (one source of influence on judgments
of agency) that stem largely from the motor system. Although
this revised model has been well accepted by researchers of SoA,
surprisingly little empirical work has been conducted to explore
the connections between cognition of agency (i.e., SoA-relevant
cognitions) and the basic processes assumed to drive SoA,
seemingly indexed by the indirect measures. One possible reason
for this is the lack of a valid and reliable tool for measuring
such decontextualized, cross situational (or “chronically held”)
cognitions (Eitam and Higgins, 2010).
Our search for existing, potentially relevant tools for directly
assessing the sense of agency identified measures that are indeed
conceptually related to the general SoA but are either context-
specific, such as a recent measure that probes the disruption of
SoA during hypnosis (Polito et al., 2013), or measures that assess
related concepts but do not directly capture the SoA as defined
above, such as Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), Locus of Control
(Rotter, 1966) or Sense of Control (Lachman and Weaver,
1998). Other existing measures that are seemingly related but
are even further removed from the current nature of the study
of human agency include those probing for very general and
abstract philosophical beliefs, like endorsement of determinism
of fatalism (Paulhus and Carey, 2011). The goal of the present
project was to develop and test a measure designed to directly
assess the general SoA. To this end, we assessed the factor
validity of the newly developed scale (Study 1) and subsequently
cross-validated the selected factor structure and evaluated the
instrument’s construct validity (Study 2).
STUDY 1–SCALE DESIGN
Item Generation
In the first phase of the SoAS (Sense of Agency Scale)
development we aimed to define the item domain, capturing
the broad sense of the construct. Based on a review of relevant
psychological literature on the sense and judgment of agency
(Berti and Pia, 2006; Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Synofzik et al.,
2007; David et al., 2008; Desantis et al., 2011; Haggard and
Chambon, 2012; Moore and Obhi, 2012) and following a similar
procedure by Polito et al. (2013), we attempted to describe the
phenomenological, cognitive, and meta-cognitive experience of
agency (or the lack thereof). The item domain is thus constituted
by statements describing one’s own SoA-relevant experiences. It
2As often is the case in the debate regarding the causal role of consciously
held beliefs it is impossible to rule out the possibility that the agency-relevant
information given to participants (e.g., the appearance of the “X” symbol will
indicate that in the coming trial you will have no control) affects the basic
(seemingly unconscious) processes involved in so-called implicit judgment of
agency directly, rather than affecting them by being consciously held.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1552
Tapal et al. The Sense of Agency Scale
should be noted that in the case of the SoA construct as described
here, such statements do not relate to any specific actions or
effects, but rather to one’s “summary” of her experience of self-
agency. Based on the literature referenced above, the subjective
experience of agency could be characterized very differently;
hence, we attempted to generate items tapping into multiple
aspects of the agency experience, such as a controlling self (e.g.,
“I am in full control of what I do”), a physical self (e.g., “My
movements are automatic—my body simply makes them”) or
one’s interaction with the environment (e.g., “I can’t predict how
my actions will affect my environment”).
With respect to item wording, per our goal to quantify one’s
cross situational or “chronic” SoA, we attempted to generate
statements reflecting one’s context-independent experiences of
self-agency, as well as statements corresponding to one’s context-
independent experiences of lack of agency. The total number of
items created was 36, of which 20 were worded to capture lack of
agency experiences.
Item Selection
With an initial set of 36 different statements, we proceeded to the
next step of refining the item selection based on the assessment
of content validity.
First, items were subjected to peer evaluation of content
validity by doctoral students and faculty who were not part of
this study but are knowledgeable on the topic. Second, the entire
item set, originally worded in English, was translated to Hebrew
and subsequently back-translated. Following these steps, the item
set was administered over the internet to 236 participants drawn
from a student participant pool at the University of Haifa.3 with
responses recorded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). The mean age of the entire participant pool
population was 24.3 (SD = 3.6), and the population consisted of
24.2%males (Sample demographic data were lost due to technical
malfunction). Apart from completing the scale, the first 40
respondents were inquired about item intelligibility, ambiguity
and clarity.
Subsequently, in an effort to reduce the number of items
and refine the instrument while maintaining content validity, 13
items were selected based on the evaluation of content validity,
item response variability, pilot study participants’ ratings of
item clarity and the magnitudes inter-item correlations; while
attempting to keep at least a roughly equal number of “agency
experience” and “lack of agency experience” items (6 and 7,
respectively).
Exploratory Factor Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis was performed on the 13 items
in CEFA (Browne et al., 1998) using GLS as the discrepancy
function (the first three eigenvalues were 4.3, 1.7, and 1).
Originally, we expected a unidimensional solution; however,
although a one-factor model yielded a satisfactory fit, χ2
(65)
=
3This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of The
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Haifa. with written informed
consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by The Institutional
Review Board (IRB) at the University of Haifa..
124.8, RMSEA = 0.063 (90% CI = 0.046, 0.079), RMSP =
0.11, the matrix of residuals contained meaningful clusters of
unexplained item covariance. Thus, two- and three-factor models
using the same discrepancy function and an oblique Quartimax
rotation were also investigated. We concluded that the two-
factor model performs optimally, χ2
(53)
= 70.5, RMSEA = 0.037
(90% CI = 0.000, 0.059), RMSP = 0.05, while keeping the
model relatively simple and the factors most easily interpretable.
The three-factor model, χ2
(42)
= 47.8, RMSEA = 0.024 (90%
CI = 0.000, 0.059), RMSP = 0.04, resulted in only a slight
additional decrease in the magnitude of the residual matrix
elements at the expense of adding an additional latent variable
of problematic interpretability. Table 1 shows the two-factor
model loadings after rotation. The two factors were moderately
correlated (r =−0.39).
Given item content, we labeled the first factor “Sense of
Positive Agency (SoPA)” and the second factor “Sense of Negative
Agency (SoNA).” For the interpretation of the factors, as well as
for an argument on whether the two should be understood as
distinct constructs or, rather, as two facets of the same construct,
see the section General Discussion.
Reliability
The reliability of the two subscales was (McDonald’s) ω = 0.78
(95% CI = 0.73, 0.82) and ω = 0.76 (95% CI = 0.71, 0.81) for
the SoPA and SoNA, respectively (confidence intervals created
using bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping with 1,000
TABLE 1 | Factor loadings of items after rotation.
Factor
Item SoPA SoNA
1. I am in full control of what I do 0.66 −0.07
2. I am just an instrument in the hands of somebody
or something else
−0.22 0.44
3. My actions just happen without my intention 0.01 0.71
4. I am the author of my actions 0.44 −0.39
5. The consequences of my actions feel like they
don’t logically follow my actions
−0.26 0.38
6. My movements are automatic—my body simply
makes them
0.17 0.69
7. The outcomes of my actions generally surprise
me
0.01 0.56
8. Things I do are subject only to my free will 0.80 0.12
9. The decision whether and when to act is within
my hands
0.53 −0.25
10. Nothing I do is actually voluntary −0.09 0.57
11. While I am in action, I feel like I am a remote
controlled robot
−0.11 0.52
12. My behavior is planned by me from the very
beginning to the very end
0.63 0.02
13. I am completely responsible for everything that
results from my actions
0.51 −0.04
SoPA, Sense of Positive Agency, SoNA, Sense of Negative Agency. Generalized Least
Squares with Quartimax rotation. The higher of the two loadings appears in bold.
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FIGURE 1 | The structure and parameters of the two-factor confirmatory model. SoPA, Sense of Positive Agency, SoNA, Sense of Negative Agency. The figure
presents (from left to right) standardized residuals, standardized loadings and the correlation between the two latent variables. Variances of both latent variables were
constrained to 1 for identification purposes.
replications). To obtain an estimate of the constructs’ stability
over time, the original sample was contacted again 2 months after
the first wave of data collection and the scale was administered for
the second time. Ninety-one participants provided their answers,
and test-retest reliabilities (calculated as latent correlations) were
r = 0.78 for the SoPA and r = 0.74 for the SoNA, supporting
the interpretation that we are indeed estimating people’s cross-
situational SoA.
STUDY 2–CONFIRMATORY FACTOR
ANALYSIS AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In the next phase, data from a community sample of 408
participants (mean age of 39.8, SD = 16.1, 51% males) were
collected using a commercial on-line panel in Israel (Midgam,
http://www.midgampanel.com). The two-factor model from
Study 1 was fit to the data using GLS estimation in lavaan
(Rosseel, 2012); two additional items (item 4: I am the author
of my actions; and item 5: The consequences of my actions
feel like they don’t logically follow my actions) were removed
before the analysis was performed since they substantially cross-
loaded on both factors in the preceding exploratory analysis.
The variances of both latent variables were fixed at 1 for model
identification. The model fit was satisfactory, χ2
(43)
= 93.0,
RMSEA = 0.054 (90% CI = 0.039, 0.069), RMSP = 0.06, CFI
=0.83; the correlation between factors was r = −0.38, which is
practically identical to the correlation estimated in Study 1. Note
that incremental fit indices such as CFI are not very informative
here since the baseline RMSEA is 0.116 (less than 0.158; Kenny
et al., 2015). Figure 1 contains themodel diagramwith parameter
estimates.
Reliability
Reliability estimates were again computed using the new data,
with reliability estimated at (McDonald’s) ω = 0.80 (95% CI =
0.76, 0.83) and ω = 0.75 (95% CI = 0.67, 0.79) for the SoPA
and SoNA, respectively (confidence intervals created using bias-
corrected and accelerated bootstrapping with 1,000 replications).
Assessment of Validity
Data on multiple relevant constructs were also collected in
order to assess the construct validity of the SoAS. For each
construct, the measurement instrument4 and empirical results
are described and discussed below. Table 2 shows the latent
correlations between these constructs and the two SoAS factors,
obtained from a structural model fit in lavaan (Rosseel, 2012).
4Hebrew versions of the instruments described here were used in the study.
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External Locus of Control −0.35* 0.33*
FAD-Plus–Free Will 0.49* −0.26*
FAD-Plus–Scientific D 0.15 0.10




BC–Body Competence 0.24* −0.10
SoAS, Sense of Agency Scale; SoPA, Sense of Positive Agency; SoNA, Sense of
Negative Agency; GSES, General Self-Efficacy Scale; Scientific D, Scientific Determinism;
Fatalistic D, Fatalistic Determinism; PSE, Physical Self-Efficacy; BC, Body Consciousness.
*Significant at p < 0.05.
The structural model allowed for correlations between all latent
variables to be estimated, and was fit using a robust DWLS




= 8246.81, RMSEA= 0.037 (90% CI= 0.035, 0.038), CFI
= 0.89 (note again that the baseline RMSEA was 0.108; and so
incremental fit indices like CFI are less informative; Kenny et al.,
2015).
General Self-Efficacy
While Self-efficacy theory and corresponding measures
emphasize the importance of domain-specificity (Bandura,
1977; see below results obtained using a domain-specific Self-
efficacy measure), generalized beliefs in Self-efficacy have been
shown to be a useful predictor of “ego strength” and beliefs in
personal control (Sherer et al., 1982). General Self-efficacy (GSE)
represents a generalized, positive belief in personal competence
and ability to organize and execute desired (i.e., goal-directed)
behavior. As SoA is often confounded by the one’s sense of being
effective in attaining one’s desired outcomes (Higgins, 2011),
this construct is highly relevant to the SoA (or the lack of it).
The question is to what degree the SoAS differentiates between
beliefs about one’s general effectiveness in attaining goals and
one’s sense of agency. In order to empirically evaluate the degree
of similarity between the SoPA/SoNA constructs and GSE, we
administered the General Self-efficacy Scale (GSES, Bosscher and
Smit, 1998) which reflects three underlying aspects of GSE—the
willingness to initiate behavior (Initiative; note however, that
the “Initiative” items in GSES, actually measures the lack of
initiative), the willingness to expend effort to continue behavior
(Effort) and the willingness to persevere in behavior despite
hardship (Persistence; again, the wording of items in the GSES
implies the opposite of persistence). As can be seen in Table 2,
the size of the correlations indicates that a substantial amount of
the SoAS variance was unexplained by the GSE, supporting the
conclusion that the GSE and the SoA as measured by the SoAS
measure different, albeit related, constructs.
Physical Self-Efficacy
For the sake of conceptual consistency, we also examined
the relationship between the SoA as measured by the SoAS
and an agency-relevant domain-specific form of Self-efficacy
(Bandura, 1977). We administered the Physical Self-efficacy
Scale (PSE; Ryckman et al., 1982), measuring beliefs in
personal competence specifically related to one’s physical body,
and further distinguishing between perceived physical ability
and self-presentation confidence. We selected Physical Self-
efficacy because proximal control over our own body is
arguably the “core” of agency beliefs (Elsner and Aschersleben,
2003). We found that the Self-Presentation Confidence PSE
subscale (but not the Ability subscale) exhibits a moderately-
strong relationship with both SoAS subscales (in the predicted
direction). This finding suggests that being pleased with one’s
physique is related to one’s sense of control of the body,
mind and the environment. We speculate on the nature
and directionality of this relationship in the section General
Discussion.
Locus of Control
The findings regarding self-efficacy suggest that SoA relevant
beliefs—as measured by the SoAS—are not merely specific or
general beliefs in personal competence, whether physical or
otherwise. However, it is possible that the SoAS items may
reflect a close conceptual relative of Self-efficacy—the Locus
of Control (LOC; Rotter, 1966), that is, individuals’ beliefs
regarding their control over obtaining desired outcomes. Note
that in some previous experimental and theoretical work authors
differentiated both conceptually and operationally between
motivation stemming from working toward and obtaining
desired outcomes and motivation which stems from working
toward and obtaining control (Eitam et al., 2013; Karsh and
Eitam, 2015; Karsh et al., 2016 for conceptual analyses see White,
1959; Higgins, 2011). To address the association between these
twomotivations whenmeasured by self-reports, we administered
Rotter’s (1966) LOC scale. The correlations between LOC and
the two SoAS factors were fairly modest, lending support to the
conceptual difference between judgments of having control over
obtaining desired outcomes (or of not having undesired ones)
and the SoA.
Free Will and Determinism Beliefs
As we have seen so far, the SoAS seems to measure a
unique construct, differing empirically from beliefs in personal
competence and Locus of Control. However, another viable
possibility is that the pattern obtained above stems from that
fact that the SoAS, rather than measuring people’s beliefs about
their own agency (i.e., their SoA) simply reflects lay, culturally
transmitted perceptions of the philosophical notions of free
will, unpredictability and/or determinism. Although the SoAS
items do not directly probe for such lay theories, they might
indirectly capture them nonetheless. To examine this possibility,
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we administered the Free-Will and Determinism Beliefs Scale
(FAD-Plus; Paulhus and Carey, 2011). The FAD-Plus consists
of four distinct subscales which target beliefs in 1: Free Will,
2: Fatalistic Determinism, 3: Scientific Determinism, and 4:
(ontological) Unpredictability. As seen in Table 2, the four FAD-
Plus subscales were differently related to the SoAS subscales—
specifically, beliefs in free will were moderately related to the
SoPA subscale and their relationship to the SoNA subscale
was substantially weaker. This pattern suggests that SoPA is
more related to philosophical concepts of personal autonomy
and responsibility than SoNA. The opposite can be said about
Fatalistic Determinism, which is not at all related to SoPA but
was associated with SoNA, suggesting the latter’s connection
to assumptions on the role of fate and unchangeable destiny.
The pattern of correlations also lends support to the conceptual
differentiation between the SoAS factors and further indicates
that SoNA, rather than merely reflecting the lack of a sense
of agency, might reflect something akin to the endorsement of
“existential helplessness.” Additional support for the conclusion
that the SoNA subscale reflects such helplessness is that it was
weakly and positively related to Unpredictability (while the SoPA
subscale was not). Interestingly, Scientific Determinism, which
most clearly represents the endorsement of the philosophical
stance that biological and environmental forces dominate human
behavior and personality, did not correlate with either subscale.
Body Consciousness
Up to this point we have presented findings that both differentiate
between the SoA as measured by the SoAS from other closely
related beliefs about the self and relevant lay theories and
show its relationship to them. In addition, we evaluated the
degree to which the SoAS taps into certain aspects of self-
monitoring and bodily awareness that have been recently linked
to the so-called “minimal self ” (Aspell et al., 2013; for a recent
review see Blanke, 2012). At least in relation to phenomenal
experiences, scholars have differentiated between body ownership
(the feeling that this body/body part is mine) and SoA. This
was particularly relevant as SoAS includes items that directly
refer to one’s body such as “My movements are automatic—
my body simply makes them” or “While moving and acting, it
feels like I am a remotely controlled robot” which may capture
individual differences in body monitoring and hence may be
related more strongly to body ownership than to the SoA. In
order to quantify the relationship between one’s attention to the
body, its states and the SoAS scores, we administered the Body
Consciousness Questionnaire (BC, Miller et al., 1981), which
measures three distinct aspects—Private Body Consciousness,
Public Body Consciousness and Body Competence, the latter
being the only strictly evaluative aspect of bodily awareness.
Based on the magnitude of correlations, neither aspect seems to
be substantially related to the SoAS, indicating that our new scale
does not capture bodily monitoring or variation in one’s feeling
of body ownership.
Interim Conclusion
The relationships of conceptually relevant constructs to the two
SoAS factors, one capturing cognitions of positive agency and
the other cognitions of negative agency (tentatively described
as being akin to “existential helplessness”). While these two
subscales coherently relate to conceptual neighbors such as
Locus of Control and beliefs in free will, they are sufficiently
dissimilar to warrant their unique measurement. For example,
negative agency seems not to be a “scientific” or “cold” form of
determinism, but rather a fatalistic, pessimistic, and potentially
de-motivating kind. This is intriguing, considering that the
SoAS does not measure whether an individual feels that he/she
perpetually fails to meet her goals—which would be associated
with anhedonia or hopelessness—rather, the SoAS focuses on
control of rudimentary, basic (maybe even mundane) faculties,
such as locomotion or the stream of thought.
Incremental Validity
Beyond establishing that while the SoA as measured by the SoAS
relates to relevant constructs, it is not redundant with any one of
them we wanted to test its validity by examining whether it has
any incremental value over and above the instruments and/or
constructs reviewed above. Given that recent work has focused
on the SoA of people suffering from obsessive-compulsive (OC)
tendencies and disorder (e.g., Rossi et al., 2005; Belayachi and
Van der Linden, 2010; Gentsch et al., 2012; Oren et al., 2016),
we chose to examine whether our measure, which appears to
capture unique elements of SoA, would correlate with the severity
of OC symptoms beyond the measures presented above (i.e., its
conceptual relatives).
The phenomenology of compulsions, one of the defining
features of OCD, implies a deficient SoA, as individuals with
OCD chronically experience that they do not choose some of
their actions freely but are compelled to act in certain ways. More
generally, a central assumption in Shapiro’s (1965) classic theory
of OCD is that obsessive-compulsive (OC) individuals have a
deficient sense of autonomy and agency. Nevertheless, only a
handful of studies have empirically examined the SoA in OCD
patients, and fewer yet have examined basic processes believed to
contribute to the SoA. For example, one study (Gentsch et al.,
2012; see also Rossi et al., 2005) examined EEG responses of
OCD and control participants to self-generated vs. externally
generated visual stimuli and found the that the suppression
of the N1 component was reduced in OCD participants
(seemingly related to muted sensory attenuation—see section
Introduction).
While these observations indicate a diminished SoA in
OCD patients, other findings appear to lead to the opposite
conclusion. The OCD-related construct of inflated responsibility
(Salkovskis et al., 1999), for instance, suggests a heightened SoA
in this population. Similarly, OCD patients often believe that
their thoughts would automatically lead to actions (“thought-
action fusion”; Shafran et al., 1996) or events in the world
(“thought-event fusion”; Gwilliam et al., 2004), which also
appears to suggest an elevated SoA. In line with these
observations, Reuven-Magril et al. (2008) found an increased
illusion of control in participants with high OC tendencies
as well as in OCD participants. A similar duality was
observed in the study by Gentsch et al. (2012): while the
EEG indices in OCD participants suggested less agency as
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indexed by sensory attenuation, the direct (contextualized)
probes of agency were higher in OCD participants compared
to controls when participants rated the relation between
their actions and visual stimuli. Furthermore, these direct
judgments of agency were correlated with the severity of OC
symptoms.
In sum, both the phenomenology of OCD and extant research
findings suggest a distortion in the SoA in OCD, but the direction
of the distortion appears to vary. We reasoned that by measuring
one’s cross situational or “chronic” sense of agency with the SoAS,
we would be able to measure core beliefs about own agency
in OC individuals. Furthermore, both Self-Efficacy and Locus
of Control were shown to be related to both OC tendencies
and depression (e.g., Molinari and Niederehe, 1985; Ehrenberg
et al., 1991; Scholz et al., 2002). We therefore administered
two widely used and psychometrically sound instruments—the
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck et al., 1996) and
the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al.,
1998). The question we posed here was whether either of the
SoAS subscales would explain any significant amount of variance
in OCI-R scores that is not explained by Self-Efficacy or Locus
of Control alone. Given the substantial correlation between
depressive and OC symptomology, we controlled for depressive
symptoms using the BDI-II score.
Table 3 contains the latent correlations between each of the
SoAS subscales, BDI-II and OCI-R, controlling for the effect
of the other candidate predictors (GSES, PSE, and LOC). As
can be seen, the SoPA subscale did not correlate with either
depressive or OC symptoms, while the SoNA subscale positively
correlated only with OC symptoms. That is, negative agency
alone was moderately related to OC symptoms, even after
depressive symptoms were controlled for. Beyond the evidence
for incremental validity of the SoAS instrument, we see this as
a theoretically important finding that we develop further in the
section General Discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We presented empirical evidence supporting the validity of the
SoAS as a direct measure of cross-situational or “chronic” sense
of agency. In what follows, we briefly highlight a few empirically
driven and conceptual points that emerged during the process of
developing and evaluating the SoAS.





For the correlations with BDI-II above, the effects of GSES, PSE, LOC, and OCI-R are
controlled. For the correlations with OCI-R above, the effects of GSES, PSE, LOC, and
BDI-II are controlled. BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; OCI-R, Obsessive-Compulsive
Inventory Revised; GSES, General Self-Efficacy Scale (all three factors); PSE, Physical Self
Efficacy (both factors); LOC, Locus of Control.
*Significant at p < 0.05.
Dissociating Sense of Agency from
Effectiveness in Obtaining Desired
Outcomes
The Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS) was developed as a tool
for measuring individuals’ beliefs about being agents in the
sense of generally experiencing control over one’s body, thought
and immediate environment. Such a tool can enable the
quantification and dissociation between (1) the influences of
experiencing success in having what one needs and/or desires
and (2) experiencing success in controlling the environment
and/or oneself (White, 1959; Eitam and Higgins, 2010; Higgins,
2011; Eitam et al., 2013; Karsh and Eitam, 2015; Karsh et al.,
2016). Indeed, this dissociation was nicely demonstrated by
the pattern of correlations obtained between the SoAS and
the two measures of Self-Efficacy (both general and specific).
Self-Efficacy, reflects one’s agency in the sense of being “free”
to perform an action that is key to goal attainment (e.g.,
approaching a Boa constrictor to reduce a debilitating snake
phobia; Bandura, 1977). Conversely, the SoAS is designed to
measure SoA dissociated from instrumentality or goal-relevance.
Direct and Indirect Measures of the Sense
of Agency
As stated in the section Introduction, recent years have seen
a resurgence of empirical interest in the sense of agency,
whether by directly measuring peoples’ conscious-deliberate
judgements of the current degree of control they have over
an experimental situation or of “authoring” (i.e., generating)
a specific experimentally induced perceptual outcome or via
indirectly indexing it through a number of phenomena such as
intentional binding. Surprisingly, recent work has shown that
the two types of measures can be uncorrelated (Kumar and
Srinivasan, 2013; Dewey and Knoblich, 2014) and/or that the
correlation between them may depend on the salience of factors
influencing them and on the specific measures used (Nisbett and
Wilson, 1977; Karsh et al., 2016).
Previous studies using direct measures of SoA have asked
participants directly about their SoA in regard to specific actions
or effects that occurred in the context of the experiments they
participated in (e.g., Reuven-Magril et al., 2008; Gentsch et al.,
2012). The SoAS measure, in contrast, is a direct measure that
targets one’s “chronic” or cross-situational experience of agency,
as distinct from how it unfolds in a specific experimental task
or for a specific experience of agency. This was done by asking
participants about their general perceptions and cognitions
regarding their own SoA in general and in regard to multiple
aspects of the experience of agency. As such, the SoAS may
enable some structuring of the complicated and often-conflicting
pattern of findings obtained by direct and indirect measures of
SoA and of the relationships among them by enabling consistent
measurement of individual differences in (or situational effects
on) “global” sensing of agency.
One Construct with Two Facets or Two
Constructs?
The first major finding generated by the SoAS is that what
we have termed “Sense of Positive Agency” (SoPA)—essentially
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feeling in control of one’s body, mind and environment—
is only moderately correlated with the “Sense of Negative
Agency” (SoNA)—the feeling that the above are not under
one’s control5. We made sense of the two factors and their
estimated correlation in line with the neuroscientific evidence
of anatomical differentiation between “positive” (“I am the
agent”) and “negative” (“I am not the agent”) agency judgments
(Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer and Franck, 2003; Nahab et al.,
2011; Sperduti et al., 2011). Further favoring the differentiation
between “positive” and “negative” SoA is the intriguing evidence
collected from epileptic patients whose brains were directly
stimulated at the anterior cingulate cortex region (ACC; argued
to be involved in motor and cognitive control, among other
things) and who consistently, during stimulation, reported a
feeling of a looming “ominous event” which they cannot control
or handle (Parvizi et al., 2013). The “negative” agency may be
a generalized case of the one captured by the literature which
focused on learned helplessness (for reviews see Maier and
Seligman, 1976; Abramson et al., 1978), which is the special case
in which the (usually aversive) external environment is not under
one’s control—a case that is cross-situational (or “chronic”) and
cross-domain rather than focusing on a specific instance or aspect
of the experience of agency. At this stage we can only speculate at
what might be the impact of scoring high on Negative Agency
but given the passivity generated by the far more local “learned
helplessness” we are assuming it may have severe consequences
regarding people’s motivation to act (see also section Sense of
agency and psychopathology).
Further support for the differentiation between positive and
negative agency as well as for the hypothesized relationship
between negative agency and helplessness comes from a recent
study (Karsh et al., unpublished data). In this study the
participants’ degree of control over noxious electrical current
applied to the participant’s finger (either controlled by the
participant or applied automatically by a controlling computer)
and its temporal predictability (timing fully predictable or not)
were manipulated. Although the authors expected to find a
strong negative correlation between self-reported feelings of
being in control and feeling helpless, the two were only weakly
correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.3). Thus, it is possible that two SoAS
subscales, SoPA and SoNA, map onto the feeling of control
and of a variant of helplessness, correspondingly. Interestingly,
as stated above, different brain regions were shown to be
involved in situations in which participants had an objective
or subjective experience of control compared to ones in which
they had no control over mundane effects. Thus, although
more research is needed, we propose that, at least when one’s
“global” sense of agency is concerned, the seemingly continuous
sense of agency could be parsed into two different judgments—
having control and being existentially helpless or, alternatively,
to the “hot” affective-counterpart of not having control
(Karsh et al., unpublished data).
5Note that it is not the case that the items of the SoNA subscale are worded
negatively.
Sense of Agency and Psychopathology
A second finding generated by the SoAS is the surprisingly high
correlation between the SoNA factor and the degree of reported
obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms, even after controlling for
the relationship between OC symptoms with depression as well
as for a number of close concepts (including the SoPA subscale).
On one hand, this finding is commonsensical—the more people
suffer from disrupting, intrusive thoughts and the more they
fail in their attempts to control these thoughts, the less control
they would likely feel. Still, the literature on the relationship
between OCD symptomology and the sense of control doesn’t
paint such a clear picture. In fact, one could have made the
opposite prediction in that people who perform acts with the
belief that these will prevent looming disastrous events (e.g., a
loved one’s death) could entertain having omnipotent control.
Along the same lines, Pacherie (2008) hypothesized that the
characteristic feature of OCD is an abnormally low SoA that
may be counteracted by rituals; these serve to create an illusory
SoA that then helps to reinstate the desired feeling of control
(see also Reuven-Magril et al., 2008). In other words, it may
well be that a highly OC person experiences fluctuations in self-
agency and sense of control. This may motivate compensatory
efforts to control all actions, thoughts, impulses and emotions.
Such a compensatory mechanism is exhibited when a person
with OCD tries to prevent negative events, on which he/she
has no control, by controlling what he/she does, thinks, desires,
or feels. It is possible that by distilling the core of the agency
experience (most importantly from the contribution of success
or failure in attaining positive outcomes to one’s sense of
agency), the SoAS has managed to capture the magnitude of
uncontrollability/helplessness that OC symptoms generate.
The fact that our findings are consistent with those obtained
with indirect measures (Rossi et al., 2005; Gentsch et al., 2012;
Oren et al., 2016) suggests that the assessment of SoA through
direct measures can capture the more primary, diminished SoA
in high OC individuals. What may help explain the existing
discrepancy between indirect and direct measures is that in
previous studies, direct probes of agency measured the SoA
derived from a specific action conducted by the participants
(e.g., Reuven-Magril et al., 2008; Gentsch et al., 2012) while we
asked participants about their general cognitions and perceptions
regarding their SoA. Future studies could further examine the
degree to which extant indirect measures of SoA correlate with
the SoAS.
Future Directions
Our goal was to develop a measure of “chronic” or general
belief in having “core” agency. One of the purposes for creating
this measure was to enable the investigation of whether such
general beliefs would modulate indirect judgments of agency—
in other words, whether they would be related to (the currently
used) indirect measures of agency, such as intentional binding
(Haggard et al., 2002) or sensory attenuation (Desantis et al.,
2012). Therefore, employing both SoAS and implicit measures of
agency in the same study is the next necessary step in this line of
research.
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It should be noted that the results presented here should be
viewed as preliminary and as a first step toward attempting to
measure “chronic” sense of agency. Another caveat is that our
data were collected using the Hebrew version of the SoAS and
thus the conclusions presented cannot be automatically applied
to other languages. A validity study of an English translation
is warranted before the SoAS can be sensibly used in English-
speaking samples.
Finally, the intriguing and substantial correlation between OC
symptoms and negative agency definitely warrants systematic
exploration. A reasonable first step would be to see whether the
pattern found holds in OCD-diagnosed patients and to continue
testing whether indirect measures of agency also follow this
pattern. If they do, this could address the apparent discrepancy
in regard to SoA of people suffering from OCD reviewed above.
A second step may be an experience sampling study with people
diagnosed with OCD using a modified version of the SoAS
targeting daily (or even hourly) fluctuations in the SoA. Such
monitoring augmented by collecting information on people’s
internal and external experiences would allow the identification
of key factors driving the negative sense of agency. In turn,
the identification of such factors may enable zeroing in on
the malfunctioning processes underlying this (agency bound)
disorder.
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